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Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales, Jr.
The Iraq War: A Military History. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press (Belknap), 2003.
312pp. $25

The pairing of Professor Williamson
Murray and retired Army major general
Robert Scales, Jr., is a potent and unusual combination of combat experience and superb scholarship. The Iraq
War captures both the strategic underpinnings of the war and the operational
designs that led to the stunning success
of the initial military campaign of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The end product is an extremely rare occurrence—an
insightful overview and assessment of
the second Gulf war produced while the
guns were still warm.
That this duo joined forces to produce
such a superlative history is not unexpected. Murray’s reputation as a military historian of the first rank was
recently confirmed in his highly acclaimed A War to Be Won (Harvard
Univ. Press, 2000), an operational-level
perspective of the Second World War
coauthored with Allan Millett. Murray’s
credentials also include his role as the
principal author of the Gulf War Air
Power Survey, a history of air operations in Operation DESERT STORM. His
partner in this current effort is a model
soldier-scholar, combining a thirty-year
military career as an Army artilleryman
with solid credentials, including a Ph.D.
in history from Duke University, a tour
as Commandant of the Army War College, and several previous books on firepower and future conflict. He was also
the project director and principal author of the U.S. Army’s official history
of the first Gulf war. The critical themes
of his previous book, Yellow Smoke: The
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Future of Land Warfare for America’s
Military (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003),
on the future of land power in the
twenty-first century, are suffused
throughout The Iraq War and help put
the last conflict into a larger historical
setting.
This book is a pleasure to read, combining lucid prose and mastery of both
history and operational detail to permit
the reader to grasp clearly the dynamics
of the race to Baghdad. Unlike the initial reporting of the fighting by embedded journalists, these analysts are not
limited to a narrow “soda straw” viewpoint of the war. They put the war in its
proper strategic and historical context,
and the conduct of the fighting in its
proper place with the evolving changes
in the conduct of war. The crisp text is
artfully edited, and it is amplified by
several dozen photographs and a set of
high-quality color maps. The latter are
all-too-rare additions to history texts
and further distinguish this book from
pretenders.
The concluding chapter provides critical insights on the political and military
implications of this war. This chapter
alone is worth the price of the book;
one can only hope that it will be widely
distributed among the halls of Congress
as well as in the educational centers of
the U.S. armed forces. This evidence of
the enduring nature of war, with its immutable fundamentals, will not surprise
realists, combat veterans, or military
historians. Nonetheless, it should be required reading for enthusiasts of the
putative “dot.com” economy and their
irrational exuberance for information
technology. As Murray and Scales
stress, despite overwhelming technological superiority, commanders “had to
make decisions of life and death under
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split-second pressures and an unprecedented barrage of information that was
often ambiguous, uncertain, contradictory, or quite often wrong.” The authors acknowledge a number of
changing characteristics in war, including the emphasis on speed, precision,
simultaneity, and the need for modular
force structure, interdependence between service units, and jointness at
lower levels. Yet they also stress that
true knowledge was rare. No matter
how sophisticated the intelligence collection, a real picture was rarely formed
until a human being laid eyes on the
target. Finally, the authors adroitly
connect the growing complexity of today’s battlefield with the need for
high-quality leaders who have been immersed in an intensive training and education regimen. The adaptability of
U.S. commanders made up for strategic
and intelligence inadequacies. It was
this mental agility that permitted the
creative, quick thinking that was so evident as American forces transitioned
from deliberate planning at Central
Command to reacting to real but unforeseen circumstances on the ground.
This final chapter overlooks a critical
shortfall in U.S. strategic readiness. The
U.S. military must become adept at
“multidimensional operations” to combat insurgencies and prop up failed
states. Murray and Scales admit that the
United States could have been better
prepared for the transition to stability
operations, and they admit that its military is inclined to “avoid the messy
business that lies beyond clear-cut, decisive military operations.” The U.S.
military excels at combined arms—the
combination of infantry, armor, and
artillery to enable fire and maneuver.
It is not as good at combined means—
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employing other instruments of national power, including the full panoply
of the interagency community toward a
desired end state. The American way of
war is unsurpassed at the fighting aspects of war, but this does not necessarily translate to winning the peace. This
shortfall was manifested by the failure
of both the Bush administration and
the military to prepare fully for its occupation of Iraq and the continuing
need to conduct the sort of nationbuilding activities that are occupying
the U.S. armed forces in Asia. The Pentagon is now examining innovative organizational and doctrinal changes to
address the problem. However, the solution lies beyond that five-sided structure and must include a maladroit
national security architecture that has
resisted substantive post–Cold War
realignment.
This is a remarkably impressive work,
especially since it was produced so close
to the fighting. Undoubtedly, a more
comprehensive assessment of the war
will eventually be produced, probably
years from now when distance, objectivity, and primary source material are
available. For the foreseeable future,
however, The Iraq War will be the definitive history of this complex and
multifaceted campaign.
F. G. HOFFMAN
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